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ABSTRACT
Public cloud computing solutions are desirable for business and
government agencies to outsource infrastructure technology
requirements. This decision transfers the responsibility of certain
security controls to the cloud provider, and impacts the ability for
system owner oversight of security. Government agencies are
required by law to conform to the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) that outlines a collection of
security controls that must be implemented. Cloud service
providers therefore have to implement these controls, at a
minimum, to be valid for government usage. Given the known
library of controls that must be implemented by the Cloud service
provider, this paper identifies 9% of FISMA-based NIST 800-53
security controls can be validated externally by an end-user of a
cloud service provider with confidence.
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• Security and Privacy➝Systems Security.
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Figure 1-Current and Future Cloud Security Visibility
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This paper documents an approach to assess a subset of security
controls, regardless of cloud provider. This approach increases
visibility into the effectiveness of the security controls protecting
their system, and identifies the limit of this visibility.

1. INTRODUCTION

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
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Federal agencies are directed to evaluate cloud-computing
solutions before implementing internally managed IT
infrastructure, and must still adhere to federal information security
requirements [6]. Cloud providers are being assessed and
authorized by objective third-party organizations through the
Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
(FedRAMP), authorizing them for federal agency usage. Federal
agencies can select an authorized cloud provider to host their
programs IT infrastructure. A byproduct of this approach results in
an inability for the agency itself to validate program security
control effectiveness.
These agencies would benefit from an ability to independently
validate the effectiveness of security controls that have been
implemented by and are the responsibility of the cloud provider.
This independent validation can only be executed from an end-user
perspective, the perspective of an administrator or non-privileged
user of the cloud-computing platform. Figure 1 depicts the lack of
security control assurance federal agencies have with Cloud IT and
how providing security control visibility (yellow arrow) provides
security posture intelligence.
The security of the information hosted by the cloud systems is the
responsibility of the cloud service provider. Therefore, agency
decision makers must rely on third-party organization’s
independent assessment of the cloud provider’s security controls.

Cloud computing is an IT paradigm where Internet accessible
shared IT resources can be leveraged by entities instead of
establishing a traditional internal IT infrastructure. The shared,
Internet-accessible cloud computing model allows for agile IT
infrastructure scalability, redundancy and elasticity at a reduced
cost enabling robustness in business IT continuity and fostering
innovation. Cloud computing, offered through commercial cloud
service providers (CSP), can provide organizations the opportunity
to transfer the responsibility of key information technology (IT)
elements. This IT paradigm is an appealing direction that allows
organizations to afford reliable, scalable and on-demand
technology resources in multiple service offerings.
The federal government values the flexibility and cost-saving
benefits cloud computing offers. This endorsement and direction of
moving federal agency programs to cloud computing platforms was
strengthened and supported through the enactment of the “Cloud
First” policy. The “Cloud First” policy requires federal agencies to
evaluate a variety of cloud options before making any IT
investments [6]. FedRAMP was established to centralize and
streamline federal agencies processes of evaluating reliable cloud
service providers for their needs.
The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
(FedRAMP) is a government-wide program that provides a
standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and

continuous monitoring for cloud products and services [3].
FedRAMP leverages the NIST 800-53 security controls as the
security requirements CSP’s have to meet. Federal agencies are
required to implement NIST 800-53 security controls to be in
compliance with the Federal Information Security Management
Act (FISMA) of 2002 [1]. CSP’s having to implement the same
security standards aligns to the agency’s FISMA requirements and
makes adoption, integration and agency-awareness of control
implementation more effective.
The benefits of agility, efficiency and innovation come with
additional risks. Some responsibilities for the organization’s
information security controls are transferred to the CSP. The cloud
consumer now has to weigh the trust and reliability of the CSP
when managing the risk to the program. This trade-off is a
significant concern as noted in the cloud security alliance 2015
survey of 212 IT and security professionals that showed 73% of
respondents described the top challenge holding back cloud
projects was concern about the security of data [2]. These benefits
are important to the federal government from a cost savings and
efficiency perspective. FedRAMP is in place to assist in mitigating
that risk and make pursuing migration to a cloud-computing
platform a safer, more secure option.
From 2009 to 2011 the Office of Management and Budget worked
with an alliance of public and private sector organizations to
develop a program, in concert with the Obama Administration
International Strategy for Cyberspace and Cloud First policy that
supports federal government adoption of cloud computing
solutions in a responsible manner. The program, called FedRAMP,
establishes policy, guidance and tools to define security
requirements, provide objective security assessment cases and
standardize contract language. Additionally, a reduction in cost can
be realized by agencies by leveraging an existing CSP’s Authority
to Operate (ATO), instead of the classic approach of each program
having to seek their own ATO [3].
FedRAMP relies on the security controls defined in NIST 800-53
for a low or moderate baseline with additional controls required
specific to cloud computing security risk [4]. Prior to a public CSP
being authorized to host federal agency clients, they must document
how security controls are implemented, have those security
controls assessed and receive an ATO. It is the cloud providers’
responsibility to implement these required controls and have a
certified independent third party organization assess the controls
for validation. This guarantees minimum-security compliance with
the 800-53 standard.
Information technology is a fast changing environment and
minimum compliance does not equate to maximum security. CSPs
are independently assessed by certified organizations for the entire
in-scope security control set, put forth by FedRAMP. Additionally,
CSPs are legally required to receive annual reassessments to
maintain an ATO [5].
Step six of the federally required NIST 800-37 risk management
framework is to monitor and accept the ongoing level of risk [7].
The transfer of ownership of some security controls introduces a
challenge for an agency to perform this step. Annually, a third party
assessor reassesses the security controls for the cloud provider. This
provides some assurance to the status of the security controls.
Ultimately it is the responsibility of the authorizing official over a
program to authorize a program’s security controls, both cloud
controlled and organizationally controlled [7]. This decision has to
1

The term control and control enhancement should be used
interchangeably for this research.

be made based on the efforts of parties not affiliated with the
agency.
FedRAMP requires 325 security controls for a moderate security
baseline [8]. These controls provide compliance with the
minimum-security requirements, but do not address all threats and
associated risks. For example, an availability risk not addressed
relates to the confiscation of physical hardware that is directly
hosting an agency’s data at a CSP, in support of a law enforcement
investigation. Identifying these risks allows an organization to
determine what controls would be appropriate. Furthermore, an
agency can develop additional security control test cases and
incorporate into a FedRAMP aligned self-assessing methodology.
This would provide an agency more accuracy in calculating risk
and ensuring risk aligns with the agency’s risk appetite.

3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
An exploratory research method was used to develop an approach
for understanding what FedRAMP security controls for a moderate
security baseline can be assessed from an end-user perspective for
a cloud computing platform.
Each security control is composed of one or more control
objectives. For example, having a contingency plan (CP) is a
control. Three control objectives for this control include the CP has
recovery metrics, addresses contingency roles, and addresses
assigned individuals with contact information.
There are 164 unique controls within the FedRAMP moderate
baseline, and there are 161 control enhancements. A control
enhancement is an additional risk mitigation aligned to a security
control. For example, AC-17 is a security control focused on
remote access risk. The control requires documented usage
restrictions,
configuration/connection
requirements,
implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed,
and that remote access is authorized prior to allowing such
connections. AC-17 control enhancement 1 requires remote access
be monitored and controlled. Both of these items are required in a
moderate baseline. For this research, each control enhancement is
identified as a unique control that is aligned to a similar risk area as
the control it enhances, as noted in this example. This supports the
value of 325 (e.g. 164+161) controls 1 in-scope of the research.
The methodology to determine the feasibility of a security control
being end-user assessable was based upon NIST SP 800-53A
Revision 4, Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal
Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective
Assessment Plans. The NIST SP 800-53A is developed to apply to
the controls in NIST SP 800-53, the same controls FedRAMP
requires cloud service providers to implement, to become available
to host federal programs. The 800-53A outlines testing procedures
for assessors to execute to test a controls validity by defining testing
procedures for each control’s objectives. For each control
objective, the procedure was evaluated to determine if it was
possible to execute from the end-user perspective. If all control
objectives aligned to a control were assessable from the end-user
perspective, then that control was included in the set of CSP
implemented controls that could be effectively tested by the enduser organization.
Each control was initially reviewed to determine if it was a
managerial, operational or technical control. Managerial refers to a
control that comes from individuals being put into a place of

authority to accept the risk and accountability of the system.
Operational means controls associated with processes such as audit
log reviews and incident response testing. Technical means
controls that are implemented through a configuration of a system
such as password complexity enforcement or audit log generation.
An additional category, physical, was identified that can cross-cut
operational or technical. Physical indicated controls that are
physical in nature outside of the information system such as the
presence of fire extinguishers or water shutoff valves. These could
be assessed via a physical walkthrough, and therefore received a
special designation. An assumption was made that a CSP would
allow a physical walkthrough from a client by request.
Managerial and operational control are not accessible from the enduser perspective. For example, it is not possible from an end-user
perspective to determine if management has been put in place over
information security, if budget has been allocated for information
security or if operations staff is performing audit log reviews.
Each technical control was then reviewed individually to determine
which could be assessed from the end-user perspective. If it was
possible, the control was marked in-scope. If it was not possible, an
explanation was documented. Questions asked to determine
applicability included:
•

•

•

Is this control involved exclusively with back-end CSP
processes or technology? If so, it is likely not assessable
from the end-user perspective. (e.g. auditing
configuration on cloud service systems).
Does this control relate to user accounts? If so, it is likely
assessable from the end-user perspective as the federal
program stakeholders will have user accounts to the
underlying cloud provider system, such as the virtual
machine management interface or overall account
management interface. (e.g. password complexity
requirements for user accounts)
Can this control be validated with a basic physical tour of
the cloud service provider? If so, then it’s assumed a
basic facility tour can be scheduled, and the control is
assessable. (e.g. fire extinguishers are present)

There are controls identified as end-user assessable, and received
an additional designation of red team or black team. This
designation indicates an invasive approach to testing that can
disrupt the cloud provider operations and potentially violate a
service level agreement. Red team indicates the use of hacking
tools, social engineering and deployment of malware to the cloud
service provider to determine the status of a control. Black team
indicates bringing a cloud service provider production facility
down for an extended period of time, forcing an enactment (and
validation) of the cloud service provider’s business continuity
controls. Caution should be taken before proceeding with assessing
security controls through red team or black team assessment
methods, but they are assessable from the end-user perspective, so
were identified accordingly.
For example, monitoring physical intrusion alarms and responding
to them is a required control. This can only be effectively assessed
through intentional unauthorized physical access. Additionally,
ensuring audit files are not modified or deleted is a required control.
This can be assessed by gaining unauthorized access to CSP
systems (e.g. backend systems or elevated privileges on the
Hypervisor) and attempting to delete system audit files. These
techniques will inform the controls effectiveness, but can result in
adverse impact to the CSP.

4. FINDINGS
The primary objective of this paper is to determine what security
controls are assessable from the end-user perspective for a program
hosted on a FedRAMP-accredited cloud service platform. It was
determined thirty controls were completely assessable and eightynine controls were partially assessable. The count for partially
assessable controls are inclusive of completely assessable. Table 1
shows the controls counts by NIST 800-53 control family that are
assessable, completely (CA) and partially (PA).
The research revealed 9% of security controls the CSPs are required
to implement can be assessed from the end-user perspective and
27% can be partially assessed. Partially assessed implies at least
one objective of the control can be assessed, but all objectives of
the control, per NIST definition, cannot be assessed.
Table 1 – Security Control Assessable Details
Control Family

CT

CA

PA*

ACCESS CONTROL

43

5

18

AUDIT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

19

1

2

AWARENESS AND TRAINING

5

0

0

CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT

26

0

5

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

24

2

4

IDENTIFICATION AND
AUTHENTICATION

27

5

10

INCIDENT RESPONSE

18

0

2

MAINTENANCE

11

2

3

MEDIA PROTECTION

10

1

3

PERSONNEL SECURITY

9

0

0

PHYSICAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION

20

6

12

PLANNING

6

0

0

RISK ASSESSMENT

10

0

1

SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND
AUTHORIZATION

15

0

3

SYSTEM AND
COMMUNICATIONS
PROTECTION

32

7

15

SYSTEM AND INFORMATION
INTEGRITY

28

1

11

SYSTEM AND SERVICES
ACQUISITION

22

0

0

325
Total
* - inclusive of completely assessable count
CT= Control Total
CA = Completely Assessable
PA = Partially Assessable

30

89

The results from the third-party organization audit of the CSP
implemented security controls can be requested by any federal

agency from a FedRAMP participating CSP. These results can
provide greater visibility into the security control implementation,
but caution for the effectiveness of the third-party assessment
organization must be considered. This extends the research for the
interested federal program from just the cloud service provider to
include the reliability, reputation and quality of the third-party
organization in its ability to effectively execute a security control
assessment and report the findings accurately.

5. ISSUES
These security controls are aligned to federal requirements for
federal agencies. These results can be leveraged for testing nonFedRAMP accredited CSP, but there is no understood agreement
that the controls being tested have been attested as in place by the
CSP. Therefore, this methodology and its results are useful, but
intended for entities assessing a FedRAMP approved CSP.
This research considered NIST and FedRAMP guidance. Security
controls required by FedRAMP are included in the NIST SP 80053. The NIST SP 800-53A recommends specific approaches to
assessing NIST 800-53 security control objectives. This document
was intentionally written to complement the 800-53A, but is only a
recommendation. A unique perspective on assessing the controls
that made up each control could have been taken. For the sake of
time, repeatability and consistency across research, the NIST 80053A was used.
Black team assessed controls must be exercised with extreme
caution or not at all. Assessing these controls external to the cloud
service provider requires tactics that can have significant adverse
impacts on the CSP. Black team assessed controls are concerned
with validating a CSP’s business continuity and disaster recovery.
If these controls are determined to be ineffective or not in-place the
CSP could experience downtime and loss of consumer confidence.
This could result in invalidation of SLA’s with the CSP or legal
action. For example, disabling total power to a production facility
would test their backup power controls. If these controls are not
effective, the entire production site would be unavailable.

being too voluminous to be appropriate for this paper as an
inclusion.

7. CONCLUSION
The primary objective of this paper is to determine what security
controls are assessable from the end-user perspective for a program
hosted on a FedRAMP-accredited cloud service platform. Knowing
these controls provides the ability for an organization to retain
awareness of security control implementation while gaining the
benefits of utilizing a cloud platform.
This work determined utilizing a CSP to host and complement an
organization’s IT infrastructure comes with the cost of losing
visibility into security control implementation assurance. The
research indicated 9% of FISMA required security controls for the
CSP can be independently validated from the consumer
perspective.
The research was intentionally limited to the security controls
documented within the NIST SP 800-53 revision 4 Security and
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations. These are the known controls CSP’s are required to
implement to receive FedRAMP accreditation.
A third-party organization is responsible for fully assessing a CSP
security control implementation. An organization can increase its
confidence in security control implementation by focusing on
assessing the quality and professionalism of the third-party
organization providing the independent verification and validation
of the CSP for FedRAMP accreditation, in addition to assessing the
controls identified in this paper as end-user assessable.
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